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Introduction 
This paper presents a reconceptualisation of the European Union (EU) as that of pragmatic 
power Europe. It suggests that the emergence of a multipolar world presents a critical 
opportunity to re-frame our expectations and understandings of the EU as a power in the 
world. Enabling us to look at the EU through the lenses of both ‘what it is’ and, crucially, 
‘what it can do’ relative to the position and preferences of others, pragmatic power Europe 
presents a broad based methodology for considering EU attitude, behaviour, the tactics it 
employs, and the power resources it utilises, in order to respond to the complexity, 
uncertainty and heterogeneity of preferences, and positions, at play in today’s multipolar 
world order.  
 
Challenging arguments that present the EU as either a power at a particular advantage in a 
multipolar world (K.E. Smith, 2013; McCormick, 2013; Moravcsik, 2010; Jørgensen, 2009; 
Elgström & Strömvik, 2005), or a power in decline in the face of the emerging economies 
(Webber, 2014; M. Smith, 2013; Fischer, 2010; Whitman, 2010), this paper suggests that the 
EU has in fact begun to pragmatically re-strategise, re-position, and re-act to the realities of 
an emerging multipolar world, and particularly within the context of global governance. This 
has been achieved through the moderation of its normative aspirations, the adoption of 
reactive as well as proactive forms of negotiation behaviour, by making use of its multiple 
power resources as well as multiple venues in exercising them, and by better taking into 
account the preference structures of others. Drawing therefore upon pragmatism as a 
concept of analysis, and considered in the context of EU positioning and performance 
relative to other major players, this paper shall reflect upon the need to go beyond the 
‘Power Europe’ debates as was – with their particular focus upon the EU’s differences as a 
global power, and which stress the EU’s normative identity and endeavour to be a ‘force for 
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good’ in the world (Manners, 2008) – to instead recast the EU as a power and ‘pole’ capable 
of responding both practically and realistically to the world at large.  
 
In presenting this case the paper is broken down as follows. In section one the emergence of 
a multipolar system and its implications are briefly elaborated. Section two then considers 
the literature on the EU’s global role thus far, with a particular focus upon the Power Europe 
debates and the assumptions that have been drawn over the EU’s response to new powers. 
In section three a framework for conceptualising the EU as pragmatic power Europe is 
outlined. Expanding upon initial works by Steve Woods on ‘Pragmatic Power EUrope’ 
(2011), and drawing also upon the literature addressing role theory, performance and 
international negotiation, this section details pragmatism as a concept of specific utility both 
in capturing the EU’s positioning as a global power and in consideration of its external 
performance.  In section four pragmatic power Europe is then considered in practice with 
reflections on the EU’s changing role within the specific context of global trade governance. 
The paper is then concluded with a look ahead to the development of pragmatic power 
Europe as a possible research agenda. 
The emergence of a multipolar world  
The turn of the 21st century has brought with it an emerging multipolarity in the international 
system whereby multiple centres of power, or ‘poles’ exist (Young, 2010, 3). Whilst debate 
prevails over the EU’s particular classification as a ‘pole’ in today’s multipolar system (i.e. 
Santander, 2014, K.E. Smith, 2013; McCormick, 2013; Gowan, 2012; Moravscik, 2010; 
Posen, 2009, Buzan, 2004), conventional wisdom nevertheless holds that the major powers, 
and more pertinently the major economic powers, at work in the international system today 
include the United States and the EU, as current global economic leaders, alongside the 
rising powers, advanced developing nations, China, India and Brazil (NIC; 2012; Wade, 
2011; Held, 2010; Young, 2010).     
 
The emergence of a multipolar system has had several implications for the behaviour of 
states and other actors in the international system. For realists, multipolarity is believed to 
create both heightened competition and uncertainty between states (Mearsheimer, 2007, 79, 
Layne, 1993). This is particularly found in the increasing efforts by rising powers to enhance 
their own control over the external environment by developing footholds in international 
organisations (Gilpin, 1981, 94-5; Layne, 1993, 11), and resulting in competing efforts by 
established and emerging powers to set the terms of global governance (Jacoby & Meunier, 
2010, 309).  From the liberal perspective multipolarity creates new dynamics for interstate 
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bargaining in international institutions (Moravcsik, 2010). Competition and uncertainty may 
however be managed by the mitigating influence of international institutions and the fact that 
multilateral outcomes tend to produce win-win scenarios for all parties (Keohane, 1986, 194; 
Moravcsik, 2010, 172). From the constructivist perspective multipolarity establishes new 
great power hierarchies, with new major powers prevalent amongst the top tier of negotiators 
within systems of global governance (Lake, 2013; Scott, 2013).  
 
A common understanding, highlighted by theorists from across the political spectrum, is that 
multipolarity creates a greater need for state interactions within a multilateral context (Wade, 
2011, 353; Held, 2010, 185-6; Posen, 2009, 350; Grevi, 2009, 23). Within a multipolar 
system however multilateralism does also become increasingly more complex. As Wade 
(2011) suggests, a ‘multilateral governance dilemma’ may be expected within a multipolar 
world; whereby states seek policy coordination but where the heterogeneity of interests, and 
the increase in major powers involved in core circles of decision-making, makes it 
increasingly difficult to find and sustain a consensus.   
 
As such the emergence of a multipolar world places renewed emphasis onto the strategies 
and behaviour of all of the major powers within the international system. With new great 
power hierarchies emerging, it is expected that new behavioural constraints, reputational 
concerns, potential norm competition, and changing conceptions of ‘appropriate behaviour’ 
will emerge; and not least for the established powers – the EU and United States - who have 
been required to adapt their previous patterns of behaviour to take into consideration new 
players. Multipolarity thus generates considerable challenges for the EU as an established, 
yet somewhat unique, pole in today’s world. It does however, also generate new 
opportunities for the EU to redefine its attitude towards others in the international system, to 
reconceptualise its strategic orientation and preferences, and to adapt its behaviour in order 
to achieve its preferred outcomes.  
 
Conceptualising the EU’s global role: The ‘Power Europe’ debates 
The changes that have taken place within the international system since the turn of the 21st 
century have been presented from sharply contrasting perspectives by those interested in 
the EU’s global role. On the one hand, the EU’s uniqueness as a polity and its ‘difference’ as 
a global power has been portrayed as a particular advantage in multilateral settings where 
multiple powers come together to find common solutions (K.E. Smith, 2013, 116; 
McCormick, 2013, 164; Moravcsik, 2010, 166-167; Jørgensen, 2009; Elgström & Strömvik, 
2005). As an actor believed to have ‘multilateral genes’ (Jorgensen, 2009, 189) and a 
‘coordination reflex’ (Whitman, 2010, 27) expectations follow that the EU has not only the 
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willingness to be a global ‘leader’ within today’s systems of global governance (Forsberg, 
2011; Falkner, 2007; van den Hoven, 2004), but that it’s appropriate behaviour – often 
identified with norm entrepreneurship, the setting of ambitious targets for others to follow, 
and of coming up with policy solutions (i.e. Falkner, 2007’ van den Hoven, 2004) - positions 
the EU to be ‘a force for good’ in the world (Manners 2008, 59).  From these accounts the 
EU is presented as a ‘model for the future’ (Lake, 2013, 567); a power capable of show-
casing the added value of compromise and consensus between states in a complex world. 
 
Further colouring this perspective has been the considerable effort exerted by scholars in 
defining the EU as a particular type of ‘Power Europe’ in the world. Since the early 1970s a 
series of distinctive conceptual frameworks have developed which have conceptualised the 
EU as a ‘Civilian Power Europe’ (Duchene, 1972, Whitman, 1998), a ‘Normative Power 
Europe’ (Manners, 2002; Diez & Manners, 2014) and even an ‘Ethical Power Europe’ 
(Aggestam, 2008).  In these conceptualisations special emphasis is placed again upon the 
EU’s ‘difference’ as a global actor (Diez, 2014; Manners & Whitman, 2003), in which the EU 
is seen to position itself as a power beyond power (Cooper, 2003) - one that pursues civilian 
and positive forms of influence in order to persuade others to want what it wants, and to set 
the standard in the pursuit and spread of normative values. Such conceptualisations have 
moreover been supplemented at times by the EU’s own policy rhetoric in which it has 
positioned itself to take on ‘responsibility for building a better world’ (Council, 2003). A 
common tendency within these ‘Power Europe’ conceptualisations has been to focus on 
what the EU ‘is’ and it’s seemingly ‘different’ identity from traditional conceptions of great 
power.  
 
Other more recent conceptualisations have however, sought to move beyond ‘what the EU 
is’ to focus more deliberately on ‘what the EU does’ and the influence it can wield in its 
external relations. Damro (2012, 682) for example argues that: 
 
‘While the identity of the EU may have normative and/or other characteristics, it is 
fundamentally a large single market with significant institutional features and competing 
interest groups’.  
 
He goes on to state the case for the EU as a ‘market power Europe’ whereby it, ‘exercises 
its power through the externalization of economic and social market-related policies and 
regulatory measures’ (Damro, 2012, 682). Others have further stressed the EU’s impressive 
capacity to exercise ‘regulatory power’ (Young, forthcoming), or ‘functionalist power’ 
(Lavenex, 2014). A burgeoning body of literature has further complemented this line of 
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enquiry by engaging in the analysis and explanation of EU international effectiveness and 
performance and its capacity to ‘play the game’ (Underdal, 1983) in order to achieve its 
objectives in international affairs (Dee, forthcoming, 2015; da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 
2014; Niemann & Bretherton, 2013; Jorgensen et al. 2011).  
 
And yet, a further line of debate has seen the EU addressed not as a power at any particular 
advantage in an emerging multipolar world, but rather as a ‘Declining Power Europe’ 
(Webber, 2014, see also M. Smith, 2013; Fischer, 2010; Grevi, 2009, 37). Seen to lack the 
capability and political will of a traditional great power (Posen, 2006), and to have ‘stood 
aside’ from the changing balance of power (Whitman, 2010), concerns are further raised of 
the EU’s weakening due to the global recession and corresponding Eurozone crisis (Allen & 
Smith, 2012, 171-175). From this perspective the EU has been portrayed as a power 
suffering, ‘confusion in the face of the growing power and influence’ of the emerging 
economies (Whitman, 2010, 28), and with its abilities ‘to deliver in a world of great powers’ 
increasingly being brought into question (Grevi, 2009, 37).  
 
With such conflicting expectations of the EU’s response to an emerging multipolarity, and 
with a plethora of ‘Power Europe’ concepts to now choose from, chartering a clear course for 
understanding the EU’s power and influence in today’s world appears somewhat complex. 
And yet these conflicting accounts present a useful starting point. For the one, focus is 
principally given to ‘what the EU is’ – the EU is a different type of power, a ‘force for good’, a 
unique power best capable of navigating the complexities of a multipolar world. For the other 
the focus is on ‘what the EU does’ – the EU exercises market power, regulatory power, 
functionalist power - or for some ‘does not do’ in being a power overwhelmed in the face of 
the emerging economies. In reality each of these perspectives is in part accurate, and in part 
missing a wider truth. As Woods (2011, 243) argues, ‘conceptions of EUrope…are not 
invalid but delimited. EUrope is quasi all of these and none of them entirely’.  As this would 
suggest, conceptualising the EU as a power (or indeed any power) requires consideration of 
both of what it is – its attitude to power, its strategic orientation and its positioning towards 
others – and what it does – its behaviour towards others, how and when it acts and reacts, 
the tactics it employs, the power resources it employs and the forums it uses. Critically still it 
requires elasticity and eclecticism in broadening our scope of enquiry. As it is here 
suggested, it requires a dose of pragmatism.    
 
Pragmatic power Europe: a framework of analysis 
Pragmatism began life as an American philosophical movement in the 1880s associated 
with, ‘the doctrine that truth consists not in correspondence with the facts but in successful 
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coherence with experience’ (Little, 2009, xiii). From the late nineteenth to mid twentieth 
centuries ‘classical’ pragmatism was to become the monopoly principally of the United 
States with key thinkers including James Pierce, William James and John Dewey who 
espoused the utility of science as practice and pronounced that ‘theories thus become 
instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest’ (James, 1907, cited in Bauer & 
Brighi, 2009, 4). Pragmatism is however, not a theory, nor is it a school of thought. 
Colloquially pragmatism is a term that tends to be equated with a concern for expediency 
rather than principles (Woods, 2011, 244; Bauer & Brighi, 2009, 3). Important to note 
however, is that pragmatism does not presume an absence of morality, or a preference for 
the status quo (Bauer & Brighi, 2009, 168).  
 
Instead pragmatism can be understood as an attitude whereby actions are guided, ‘not by a 
priori principles, but primarily by an assessment of the actual constraints and opportunities of 
a given context’ (Baert, 2009, 48). As such there is recognised to be ‘progressive potential’ 
with pragmatism (Bauer & Brighi, 2009, 176), thus allowing an actor to pursue a reformist or 
principled agenda, but which sees this within the constraints of the known environment. 
Critically, pragmatism is also a concept that takes into account, ‘the distinctiveness and 
irreducibility of the Other’ (Baert, 2009, 55).  It recognises the reality and practice of trying to 
impose one’s own principles on others and, ‘denounces a large proportion of Western 
thought and literary criticism for not engaging sufficiently with different cultures, and for 
imposing their own dichotomies on what is, by all accounts, a radically different cultural 
landscape’ (Baert, 2009, 55).  More than this, rather than being seen as a philosophy where 
‘anything goes’, pragmatism in fact invites us, ‘to take disciplinary boundaries less seriously, 
dispense with scholasticism, and engage in a kind of eclectic inquiry, which… puts a 
premium on creativity, reflexivity, and imagination’ (Bauer & Brighi, 2009, 2). 
 
Pragmatism is concerned therefore with ‘acting’ (Kratochwil, 2009, 20) and thus has several 
utilities when applied to the study of international relations, the exercise of power, and the 
EU.  In 2011 Cooperation and Conflict published a paper entitled ‘Pragmatic Power EUrope’2 
by author Steve Woods. In this article Woods puts forward the case for utilising pragmatism 
in ‘deciphering what EUrope does and might be, and a guide for decision-makers’ (Woods, 
2011, 245). In defining the term Woods states that: 
 
“As a method of political practice, pragmatism is flexible, prudent, sometimes 
innovative, sometimes opportune…It is oriented to achieving, from the perspective of 
                                               
2 Woods uses the term ‘EUrope’ to identify the merging of analysis of the EU with older forms of 
analysis focused on Europe 
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the practitioner, ‘optimal results’…A principle virtue of philosophical pragmatism is its 
employment of techniques or choices most applicable to a situation” (Woods, 2011, 
244) 
 
In this paper Woods presents his case for conceptualising the EU as being a pragmatic 
power by drawing on examples from the EU’s relations with Russia and China. In it he 
suggests that the EU may display normative or even ethical instincts and features in its 
foreign policy, but self-interest, and the self-interest of EU Member States particularly, are 
crucial characteristics of EU external relations (Woods, 2011, 256). He goes on to state that 
the EU - and its Member States especially - have a notably pragmatic attitude towards 
foreign policy and thus will strive to achieve optimal results for their preferred interests even 
if this is at the expense of wider collective normative principles as set out in the EU’s 
strategic rhetoric. What remains less clear from Wood’s account however, is how 
pragmatism may explicitly be conceived as an attitude, enacted as a form of behaviour, or 
exercised as a power resource.  Further framing of the concept of pragmatism and its utility 
in analysis of the EU is therefore required.  
 
As was detailed in the previous section, the emergence of a multipolar world order creates 
greater complexity and uncertainty for states, as well as establishing new great power 
hierarchies in systems of global governance. Global governance in this context is defined as, 
‘governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers’ 
(Finkelstein, 1995, 369). International institutions are particularly identified as critical forums 
for global governance; providing multilateral venues for the interaction of and negotiation 
between all states, and particularly the major powers, within the international system. In this 
way global governance, and more specifically multilateral negotiation within international 
institutions, provides a useful framework for understanding the EU’s response to other 
powers in the international system, and an important point of departure in considering 
pragmatic power Europe. 
 
More than this, with new powers rising to the fore in global governance, a renewed emphasis 
must be placed upon the strategies, preferences and roles that all of the major powers play, 
or seek to play, in their international affairs. According to Elgström & Smith (2006, 5), an 
actor’s role refers to: 
 
‘[P]atterns of expected or appropriate behaviour.  Roles are determined both by an 
actor’s own conceptions about appropriate behaviour and by the expectations, or role 
prescriptions, of other actors’.   
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Recognising that an actor may take on multiple roles in an international negotiation 
environment, and that change to the global distribution of power may result in increased role 
uncertainty and competition (Ahnlid & Elgström, 2014, 78), how an actor chooses to position 
itself relative to others may be associated with, ‘perceived responsibilities and obligations in 
foreign policy and includes policy-makers’ perceptions of what functions their state should 
perform in the international system’ (Ahnlid & Elgström, 2014, 78). How that actor then 
performs – that is, the ‘patterns of expected or appropriate behaviour’, or more generally, the 
actions that it undertakes in its role – sheds important insights on its response to others and 
its navigation of the political dynamics at play within the international system. 
 
What this in turn suggests is that pragmatism may be identified in two ways. First, 
pragmatism is a political attitude leading to a particular strategic orientation of how an actor 
should perform. To think pragmatically therefore, is to consider the world through the lenses 
of practicality, reality, and through the development of a common sense approach that takes 
into consideration the preference structures of others. This is identify as ‘pragmatic 
positioning’. Second, pragmatism is a particular behavioural characteristic or set of 
characteristics. To act pragmatically is to utilise the best modes of output, drawing on the 
most effective tactics and power resources in order to achieve optimal results. This may be 
identified as ‘pragmatic performance’. 
Pragmatic Positioning 
Pragmatic positioning relates to the EU’s attitude towards foreign policy and is concerned 
with the EU’s overall strategic orientation, its ambitions to achieve specific policy objectives, 
and how its preference structures relate to other major powers (see also Dee, forthcoming; 
Jørgensen et al. 2011; Elgström & Stromvik, 2005). With regards to strategic orientation, as 
Ahnlid & Elgström (2014, 79) elaborate, a negotiator may be, ‘a supporter of the present 
system…a revisionist actor [or]…a shirker, an actor that avoids responsibilities and 
obligations’. In the case of the EU this is particularly relevant. The EU’s strategic orientation, 
or more specifically, its strategic aspiration, as a global actor has long been associated with 
that of a ‘different’ or ‘distinctive’ identity (see Young, 2007, 789; M. Smith, 2007, 532; 
Manners & Whitman, 2003; van den Hoven, 2004; Nicolaïdis & Howse, 2002); and as one 
that prefers civilian and positive forms of influence in order to persuade others to want what 
it wants. Within the context of global governance this has further been identified with the EU 
setting itself apart as a leader, setting ambitious standards for peace and prosperity for 
others to then follow (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, 912; Nicolaïdis & Howse, 2002).  
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However, the EU must also be recognised as a rational actor who seeks to enhance its 
position and pursue its interests within the international system. Pragmatic positioning 
therefore draws attention towards the EU’s specific interests and objectives relative to the 
preference structures and ‘red-lines’ of others. This is important because, whilst Normative 
Power Europe proponents would suggest that the EU’s ‘difference’ from others is what sets it 
apart as an influential global actor (i.e. Manners, 2002; Manners & Whitman, 2003; Diez & 
Manners, 2014), it must also be assumed that the more ambitious the EU is in making 
demands of others, the harder it must then try to lead, push, or persuade others to follow its 
lead. Pragmatic positioning therefore is found where the EU balances its ambitions to ‘take 
on responsibility for building the better world’ with the reality of what others are also asking 
for and the feasibility of actually achieving its own preferred outcome.  
 
Pragmatism recognises the preference structures and ‘anticipated minimums’ (Iklé, 1964, 
192) of other negotiation partners and takes this into account in order to find some ‘zone of 
agreement’ that would make an outcome agreement possible (Underdal 1983). In bargaining 
terms, pragmatic positioning may therefore be considered where the EU, ‘seek[s] the best 
possible deal in negotiations; that is, to obtain the most from its opponent while conceding 
the least’ (Meunier, 2000, 104). The balance of power within any given negotiation context 
must also be an important consideration for EU pragmatic positioning (da Conceição-Heldt & 
Meunier, 2014), and which may be expected to result not only in the modification of EU 
ambitions if it meets extensive resistance from other major powers, but also in forum-
shopping whereby it looks to pursue its interests in multiple forum, including multilateral, 
regional, plurilateral or bilateral negotiation contexts where it may be better positioned to 
exert influence in obtaining optimal results (Woolcock, 2010, 28).  
 
Pragmatic Performance 
Distinguished from pragmatic positioning is pragmatic performance. Pragmatic performance 
is concerned with the EU’s behavioural characteristics; that is, what the EU is doing to 
achieve its preferred outcomes in global governance. This is an important distinction as 
pragmatism, with its focus on practice and practicality, must assume that if an actor adopts a 
particular position that seeks to bring about some change it must then ‘do’ something in 
order to achieve it. To first consider the EU’s performance however, questions must arise as 
to who is representing the EU in its external relations. This is necessary as often the EU is 
considered to perform well where it is at its most ‘state-like’ and ‘speaks with one voice’ 
(Jørgensen & Wessel, 2011; Gstöhl, 2009; Falkner, 2007, Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). 
However, to associate the EU performing well solely with it speaking with one voice is to 
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miss the pragmatic nuances of its actual performance, not least with regards the 
practicalities of who is speaking, when and why. In the field of trade for example, faced with 
multilateral trade negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
that spanned policy areas in which both the European Community and Member States held 
competences, the EU Member States, ‘responded pragmatically and agreed that negotiating 
with one voice through the Commission was in the EU’s best interest’ (Woolcock, 2010, 
387).  
 
Conversely, as increasing numbers of studies are starting to show, the EU has at times 
demonstrated a comparative advantage in international institutions where it has maintained 
cohesion but actually spread its voice and utilised the diplomatic weight, and relationships, of 
individual Member States to move toward a wider consensus with third countries (Macaj & 
Nicolaïdis, 2014; Dee, 2012; Laatikainen, 2010; K.E. Smith, 2006). Within the UN General 
Assembly for example the EU has showed signs of ‘burden sharing’ with its Member States 
in order to best spread its message and work more effectively with third countries 
(Laatikainen, forthcoming). Within UN based multilateral negotiations moreover cross-
alignment of EU Member States in other negotiation blocs has become commonplace (Dee, 
2012), and is increasingly being seen by the European External Action Service as not only 
complementary to the EU position, but sensible in spreading the EU voice in order to 
maximise effectiveness (Author interviews, 2011, 2014).  
 
As these examples suggest, who speaks for the EU in its external relations is a pragmatic 
calculation and one which can further take into consideration the best use of the EU’s 
multiple power resources, whether that be market power – as in the case of the Commission 
speaking on trade - or diplomatic power, as in the case of the Member States using their 
own global networks of deep historical relationships with states and regions beyond Europe 
or in other negotiation blocs to further the EU’s voice.  There is pragmatism therefore in 
using the EU’s ‘voice’ or ‘voices’ in order to best pursue the EU’s preferred outcomes.  
 
Pragmatic performance goes further than the EU’s ‘voice’ however, and relates also to its 
broader behavioural characteristics in its relations with others. It is noted that a tendency 
within the literature on the EU as a global actor has been to place particular emphasis upon 
the EU as playing a proactive, if not always necessarily effective, role in international affairs 
(McCormick, 2013; Moravscik, 2010; Jørgensen, 2009; Laatikainen & Smith, 2006; 
Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). A proactive output is here identified where the EU actively 
pursues its objectives by going first, making particular demands which can set the tone for 
negotiations, and, where necessary, working with others to build consensus in order to 
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achieve, or alter, an outcome. It may therefore include such tactics as making formal 
proposals, offers or concessions, mediating disagreements between other, conducting 
diplomatic demarches to third countries, coalition-building, or through issue-linkage where 
the EU is particularly well placed to offer economic or market-based incentives to third 
countries in return for concessions elsewhere (Iklé, 1964).  
 
The challenge with focusing only on the EU’s proactive pursuits however, is that it raises 
expectations of the EU’s ‘appropriate behaviour’ as always being just that, ‘appropriate’.  
However, as Woods (2011, 244) stresses, pragmatism allows for a variety of actions to be 
utilised by the EU and which may at times include inaction, delay, vagueness, and the 
absence of formal decision. A reactive output may therefore be the most pragmatic response 
that the EU can adopt in its performance and which may see it adopting unresponsive, 
cruising or delaying tactics in order to deter agreement on an issue it disagrees with or to 
buck-pass responsibility of ‘going first’ or ‘setting an example’ onto another party.  
 
Whilst such tactics challenge traditional conceptualisations of the EU as being a ‘force for 
good’ in the world, and as a leading player in systems of global governance, they need not 
be considered wholly in the negative. Rather a pragmatic performance is assessed where 
the EU utilises the most suitable tactics to respond to the issue or negotiation at hand in 
order to achieve optimal results. In this way a broadening of what may be considered the 
EU’s ‘appropriate behaviour’ is encouraged and which allows for the EU to act in a variety of 
ways, drawing upon its multiple power resources, in order to achieve its preferred objectives.  
 
Pragmatic power Europe in practice: The case of global trade governance3 
The argument presented here is that pragmatic power Europe is no new thing. To some 
extent the EU has demonstrated pragmatism in its foreign policy behaviour since it first 
began to ‘act’ in international relations. Whilst conceptualisations of the EU as Normative 
Power Europe suggest that normative goals drive forward the EU’s influence in the world, in 
fact the reality of international politics must suppose that an agenda driven by normative 
principles will meet resistance from others at some stage. Politics must come into play, as 
must questions of power, the balance of power, and the concern therefore for actual goal 
attainment. This is not to say that the EU has not acted normatively. Rather it is to argue that 
the EU’s normative pursuits, particularly during the late 1990s and early 2000s when 
Normative Power Europe was first conceptualised, were themselves a pragmatic response 
                                               
3 For a detailed account of the EU’s pragmatic role shift in the case of the WTO please see Dee 
(forthcoming) 
12 
 
to the internal and structural conditions at play at that time. For example in the 1990s the EU 
signed its Treaty on European Union creating not only its Common Foreign and Security 
Policy but also the Single European Market. At this time moreover, the United States was 
considered to be having its ‘unipolar moment’ (Krauthammer, 1990) whilst the emerging 
economies were still considered ‘essentially bit players’ (Baldwin, 2006). At this time within 
global governance the EU was thus able to play a leading role by either working closely with 
its partner the United States (i.e. the launch of the Doha Round in the WTO), or by 
presenting itself as an alternative to the United States (i.e. the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, or 
through its opposition over the Iraq War).  
 
The emergence of a multipolar world order has however, made it increasingly difficult for the 
EU to sustain its normative distinctiveness in the face of increasingly assertive emerging 
economies each with very different norms and preferences. The EU ‘model’ is therefore far 
less attractive today than it was at the turn of the 21st century and which has made more 
rationally driven forms of pragmatism an increasing necessity for the EU in the pursuit of its 
international objectives.  
 
No more clearly has the EU’s pragmatic shift in responding to an emerging multipolarity 
been evident as in the case of global trade governance.  Within the global trading system the 
EU has been a prominent, if not leading power, since it first rose to prominence as the 
European Economic Community. The global trading system has however been a forum 
where the rise of the emerging economies has been most keenly felt. In the late 1990s when 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was created, and in 2001 when the Doha Development 
Agenda of multilateral trade negotiations was launched, the global trading system was 
dominated by the ‘Big Two’ – the EU and the United States. Since then the global trading 
system has become increasingly complex with an increasingly assertive India, Brazil and 
China involved in the top tier of trade negotiators, with multilateral negotiations in stalemate, 
and with a resultant proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral preferential trade agreements 
being negotiated. It is therefore within this context of global reordering that pragmatic power 
Europe is considered. 
 
A pragmatic re-positioning: From managed globalisation to Trade, Growth and 
World Affairs 
In 1999 the EU’s global trade strategy was based on the doctrine of ‘managed globalisation’. 
This strategy sought to ‘manage’ or ‘harness’ globalisation through the basic principles that 
international rules should be written, and obeyed, and that international organisations should 
have their jurisdiction extended, and their powers enhanced (Abdelal & Meunier, 2010, 353). 
13 
 
With a clear multilateralist agenda that sought the strengthening and advancement of 
multilateral trade disciplines to a growing WTO membership across a wider range of trade 
and trade-related issues (Abdelal & Meunier, 2010, 357-8), the EU’s strategy was not only to 
promote openness in global trade but ‘openness the European way’, seeking to export its 
own norms and standards as a ‘globalizer’ for the multilateral trading system (Meunier & 
Nicolaidis, 2006, 912, 915).  
 
Not only prioritising the WTO as the EU’s preferred regulatory forum for global trade 
governance, the managed globalisation strategy was, in keeping with the time, notably 
normative in its orientation. In particular it was to indoctrinate far greater issue-linkage 
between the EU’s trade policy and other ‘non-trade concerns’, including many with 
distinctively normative dimensions such as development, the environment, human rights and 
good governance (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006; van den Hoven, 2004). Intending that a new 
multilateral trade negotiation should last no more than three years, the EU thus sought a 
swift, ‘comprehensive and ambitious’ round of multilateral trade negotiations (Council, 1999) 
that could complement not only its own trade preferences, but those of the developing world. 
The launch of the Doha Development Agenda, or ‘Doha Round’, in November 2001 was to 
mark a major victory for the EU’s managed globalisation strategy positioned the EU as the 
WTO’s leading, and most ambitious, actor. 
 
By 2003 the Doha Round was however, to experience the first signs of a new found 
assertiveness by the emerging economies. With ongoing disagreements over the very 
modalities that the Doha Round negotiation agenda should adopt - along with increasing 
entrenchment of the diverging stances of developed versus developing nations - the Doha 
Round was, by July 2006, suspended.  Responding to this multilateral impasse, in 2006 the 
EU re-evaluated its global trade strategy. With the EU’s efforts within the Doha Round 
proving ever more costly, and in further reaction to the United States’ own aggressive pursuit 
of numerous regional and bilateral preferential FTAs with key partners, the Global Europe 
strategy (Commission, 2006) brought a to a close the EU’s moratorium on bilateral and 
regional preferential trade agreements, and reopened the EU’s pursuit of its trade interests 
beyond the forum of the WTO. Global Europe further signalled a shift in the EU’s policy 
towards the emerging economies. No longer accepting their development status as reason 
for non-reciprocation of trade concessions within the Doha negotiations, and further 
recognising that the rising powers were combining their high growth with high barriers to EU 
exports, the EU raised its demands in expecting the emerging economies to take on greater 
responsibility in favouring market openness and to give Europe ‘something in return’ (Dee & 
Mortensen, 2014). 
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Launched in November 2010, the Trade Growth and World Affairs (TGWA) strategy was a 
further pragmatic repositioning by the EU in response to several factors. First, the economic 
crisis resulted in weakened demand for European products and enhanced the EU’s reliance 
on growth through trade, and exports particularly (Bendini, 2014). Second, projections 
showed that developing and emerging countries would account for nearly 60 per cent of 
world GDP by 2030, and with 90 per cent of world growth being generated from outside of 
Europe (Dee & Mortensen, 2014). The TGWA strategy thus placed priority onto securing the 
EU’s growth and competitiveness in a changing world, with particular emphasis on securing 
better access for EU products in traditional markets, whilst broadening its reach to access 
new markets as well. In 2013 a Commission policy communication entitled Trade, Growth, 
and Jobs (Commission, 2013) further honed the EU’s global trade strategy. This document 
set out the EU’s prioritisation of ambitious trade negotiations with advanced economies, 
including the United States and Japan, ‘anchoring’ the large emerging economies into the 
global trading system through evenly shared global-responsibilities and reciprocation, and 
through the pursuit of a ‘realistic’ agenda within the multilateral trading system4.  
 
As this reflects, in much the same way as the managed globalisation strategy was, at that 
time, considered a pragmatic necessity in the face of an increasingly globalised world 
(Abdelal & Meunier, 2010, 354), so too can the EU’s reorientation towards Global Europe, 
and its successor TGWA strategy, be seen as a pragmatic necessity in the face of today’s 
geo-politicising landscape. The EU’s formally normative and highly ambitious agenda for the 
Doha Round has thus been moderated to a more realistic, competitiveness-driven approach 
in which the EU has adopted a greater interest in reciprocation and a growing preference for 
pursuing its trading interests in those forums where it is most likely to achieve results. No 
longer pushing leadership rhetoric within the WTO, the EU today has adapted its strategic 
positioning to ‘strike the right balance between ambition and reality’ (Commission, 2013) and 
to see trade as an engine of growth and competitiveness rather than an engine specifically 
for extending EU normative power and preferences abroad. 
 
A pragmatic performance: The EU’s reactive shift in the WTO 
At the WTO’s first Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in 1996 the EU was first to 
promote the need for a wider and deeper multilateral trade agenda. In the lead up to the 
WTO’s Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999 the European Council was further 
                                               
4 It is noted that at time of writing (early 2015) the EU is again refining its global trade strategy in order 
to ‘take further steps to promote sustainable growth, increase investment, [and] create more and 
better jobs’ (Council of the European Union, 2014) 
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highlighting, ‘the importance of the EU playing a leading role in these negotiations’ 
(European Council, 1999), and had therefore begun conducting an extensive diplomatic tour 
des capitales of those WTO members most reluctant to agree to a new Round to garner 
support (Author interview, 2011; Bridges Weekly, 1999). However, when a new round failed 
to be launched in 1999 due to developing world, and particularly Indian, resistance, the EU 
was to recognise that its negotiation position was at odds with other’s preference structures 
and undertook a substantive shift in its outreach to better address the development issues of 
a new trade round (Van Den Hoven, 2004, 264). Altering its tactics to focus on what the 
multilateral trading system could do for developing countries, the EU was then able to 
persuade many more developing counties to support a new round and, by November 2001, 
the Doha Round was launched. 
 
The Doha Rounds formative years were however to prove increasingly difficult for EU 
performance. Initially proactive in putting forward offers and making concessions, particularly 
over agricultural trade liberalisation, and in pushing forward negotiations in the new trade 
issues of investment, competition, procurement, and trade facilitation (the so-called 
Singapore Issues) (Young, 2011; van den Hoven, 2004), the EU was to meet with a growing 
resistance from an increasingly assertive group of advanced developing economies led by 
India and Brazil (the G-20) (Baldwin, 2006). With India particularly reticent to negotiations 
over the new trade issues, by 2004 the EU again modified its ambitions to remove its 
insistence on negotiations over trade in investment, competition and procurement 
(Commission, 2004).  By 2005, the EU had further reached the extent of its proactivity in 
making offers and concessions, and was stressing to negotiation partners that it’s, ‘threshold 
of pain had been reached’ (WTO, 2005) and that it would concede no more on agriculture 
(Grant, 2007, 176).   
 
As was outlined above, from 2006 the EU had responded to the changing geopolitical 
dynamics at work in the global trading system and repositioned itself by lifting the 
moratorium on bilateral preferential trade agreement. By 2007 the EU had launched trade 
negotiations with other regional organisations including Mercosur and ASEAN and with third 
countries including India. After 2008 this was further reinforced by the EU’s shift to a more 
reactive output within the WTO.  In July 2008 at a General Council meeting of the WTO the 
EU was to state its agreement in principle to revised draft modalities for the Doha Round 
(Author interviews, 2011). However, with continued blocks being presented by India and the 
United States within the WTO, and with the world plummeted into global recession, whilst 
agreement was finally agreed on texts by December 2008 the Doha Round remained in a 
position of stasis with little ground made towards an outcome agreement. The stalemate 
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within the WTO has however provided opportunity for the EU to respond to the global crisis 
and more avidly pursue its bilateral trade negotiations. Whilst continuing to speak out in 
favour of the Doha Round and its necessary conclusion (i.e. Commission, 2013), since 2008 
the EU has been much more a fly on the wall in the WTO as others negotiate around it; 
positioning itself as a blameless party in the stalemate preventing progress, and awaiting 
breakthrough from the United States and emerging economies rather than actively pushing 
for progress itself (Author interviews, 2011; Dee & Mortensen, 2014).   
 
With a multilateral governance dilemma present within the WTO, since 2012 the EU has 
further shifted its output onto alternative forums, including its bilateral Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States, and a plurilateral Trade in 
Services Agreement (TiSA) (Dee & Mortensen, 2014). With an anticipated economic benefit 
of €120billion to the EU economy (CEPR, 2013) the TTIP negotiations particularly represent 
an important boost to the EU’s growth and competitiveness. TTIP and TisA further signify a 
pragmatic results-driven shift in performance for the EU with it prioritising alternative 
negotiation venues where it is better capable of extracting optimal results. Thus, whilst the 
EU continues to prioritise the WTO in its policy rhetoric (i.e. Commission, 2013), in practice it 
has pragmatically pursued its objectives within multiple venues and with multiple partners in 
order to achieve the best possible trade deals that will in turn bolster EU growth and 
competitiveness. 
 
Conclusion 
As this discussion has sought to demonstrate, the EU has demonstrated capacity to re-
position, re-strategise, and re-act to the changing dynamics of an emerging multipolarity, 
particularly in the context of global trade governance.  In so doing this paper has presented a 
reconceptualisation of the EU as ‘Power Europe’ in an emerging multipolar world. Important 
to stress is that the method here presented is not to offer a new ‘type’ of Power Europe. The 
‘Power Europe’ debates thus far have made, and will continue to make, an important 
contribution to our understanding of the EU’s global role and the various ways that it 
exercises power in the world. Rather, this paper has endeavoured to make its contribution by 
offering a re-framing of the concept of ‘Power Europe’ that draws on the concept of 
pragmatism as a tool of analysis in looking at the EU’s positioning and performance relative 
to others in an emerging multipolar system.  In particular it has reflected upon the need to 
consider the practicalities of the international system, the reality of what can be achieved in 
the context of multiple heterogeneous preference structures, and the emphasis that must be 
placed not only on what the EU wants or on how it tries to achieve its goals, but on what it 
can achieve relative to ‘others’. Pragmatic power Europe thus seeks to present a dose of 
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pragmatism to our understanding of both what the EU is as a power, and on how it 
subsequently acts as one.  
 
This is also not to suppose that the EU always gets it right. Pragmatism after all requires 
innovative thinking and careful ‘assessment of the actual constraints and opportunities of a 
given context’ (Baert, 2009, 48) which the EU may not always achieve. However, to begin to 
consider the EU through the lenses of pragmatism is to present several possible avenues of 
further research. In particular it presents the opportunity for engaging ‘in a kind of eclectic 
inquiry’, as suggested by Bauer and Brighi (2009), into the EU’s external relations more 
broadly. Of particular interest in this regard is consideration of the EU’s ‘patterns of expected 
or appropriate behaviour’ both in policy-specific governance contexts and in its relations with 
third countries. The example drawn upon in this paper of global trade governance is perhaps 
the clearest example of pragmatic power Europe in practice but it must also be recognised 
as a seemingly ‘easy’ case for the EU with regards to its capacity to act, and its relative 
position of strength within the global trading system. Of interest therefore is whether these 
findings are also to be discovered in other policy contexts i.e. in security policy where the 
EU’s ‘voice’ is more critically evaluated, or in environmental policy where the EU’s normative 
distinctiveness has been most clearly articulated.  
 
In pursuing such case-study-driven analysis a further utility may also be found in making 
greater use of discourse analysis. In the case of trade there has been a clear pragmatic shift 
in EU discourse towards the WTO since the turn of the 21st century which is reflected 
particularly in the increased use of phrases such as ‘balancing ambition with reality’ 
(Commission, 2013). Detailed discourse analysis of strategy documents, statements and 
council conclusions may especially shed interesting insights into the EU’s changing policy 
dynamic in responding to changing structural conditions. Above all, what this paper has 
sought to contribute is a reframing of expectations of the EU as a power in the world today. 
To take this concept forward therefore is to re-evaluate our expectations of the EU as neither 
a power neither at a particular advantage, nor one in decline, but rather as a power capable 
of thinking pragmatically about the world as it is, and acting pragmatically in its response to 
it.  
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